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STATUTE EXPATRIATING HYPHENATED AMERICANS
HELD UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Schneider v. Rusk
377 U.S. 163 (1964)
Petitioner, a German national by birth, acquired American citizenship
derivatively through naturalization of her mother.1 While doing graduate
work in France, she became engaged to a German citizen. Following a brief
return to the United States, petitioner was married in Germany and has
'since resided there, except for two brief visits to the United States. In
1959, more than three years after petitioner had established residence in
Germany, the United States denied her a passport, asserting she had lost
her American citizenship under section 352 (a) (1) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act of 1952.2 Petitioner filed a complaint for a judgment
declaring her to be a United States citizen and enjoining enforcement of the
denationalization statute. A statutory federal court rendered judgment for
the United States, one judge dissenting.3 Upon appeal to the United States
Supreme Court this judgment was reversed. The majority opinion by
Mr. Justice Douglas held that the statute in question was violative of the
fifth amendment due process clause.4
In resolving the constitutional issue presented in Schneider v. Rusk,5
the majority opinion began with the premise that "the rights of citizenship
of the native born and of the naturalized person are of the same dignity
and are coextensive." 6 The opinion recognized that two constitutional
questions were inherent in the challenge of section 352 (a) (1) : did Con-
1 See 66 Stat. 245 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1431 (1958).
2 66 Stat. 269 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1484(a) (1958) provides:
(a) A person who has become a national by naturalization shall lose his
nationality by-
(1) having a continuous residence for three years in the territory of a
foreign state of which he was formerly a national or in which the
place of his birth is situated, except as provided in section 353 of this
title, whether such residence commenced before or after the effective
date of this Act . . . (exceptions of § 353 were not germane to this
controversy).
3 Schneider v. Rusk, 218 F. Supp. 302 (D.D.C. 1958).
4 Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964). Chief Justice Warren, Justices Black,
Stewart, and Goldberg concurred with Mr. justice Douglas; Justices Clark, Harlan,
and White dissented, Mr. Justice Clark writing the dissent. Mr. Justice Brennan did
not take part in the decision.
5 Ibid.
6 Id. at 165. (Mr. Justice Douglas acknowledged an explicit constitutional limi-
tation). Cf. Osborn v. United States Bank, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 827 (1824): "A
naturalized citizen is, indeed, made a citizen under an act of congress.... He becomes
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gress have the constitutional power to constitute specified acts conclu-
sive evidence that a citizen had expatriated himself without requiring the
person losing citizenship to give his subjective assent to this loss of citizen-
ship rights, and, assuming an affirmative answer to the first question, did
section 352(a) (1) exceed the substantive due process limits of the con-
gressional power.7 By contrast, the minority found that section 352(a) (1)
did not violate due process, based upon constitutional history, prior legis-
lative and executive action, and judicial decisions. The dissenters declared
that the statute in question was a reasonable attempt by Congress to
resolve important problems in foreign affairs.8
Prior to 1907, the United States had no statutes providing a mode
of expatriation for her citizens. 9 In 1868, Congress declared expatriation
the "natural and inherent right of all people," 10 but this legislation was
passed in an effort to gain international recognition and acceptance of
American naturalization of citizens from other nations." Although recog-
nizing the right of expatriation, Congress did not choose to provide
uniform methods by which the United States citizen could expatriate
himself.' 2 From 1789 until 1868, the national government was primarily
concerned with expatriation as it related to individuals who left other
nations to become naturalized United States citizens, and it showed little
interest in the problem of defining when American citizens expatriated
themselves.'3 During this period the United States Supreme Court adhered
to the perpetual allegiance doctrine ;14 it did not accept the view that the
citizen could expatriate himself.15
The executive branch of the government was forced to deal with
situations where foreign powers exercised political control over their
native-born citizens who had become naturalized citizens of the United
States but had later returned to the native land. In these situations the
government adopted a pragmatic approach consonant with its power. When
it was possible, the United States intervened to protect these individuals. 16
The concept of equal protection for both native-born and naturalized citi-
a member of the society, possessing all the rights of a native citizen, and standing, in
the view of the constitution, on the footing of a native."
7 Schneider v. Rusk, supra note 4, at 166-67.
s Id. at 169-78 (dissenting opinion).
9 Tsiang, "The Question of Expatriation in America Prior to 1907," 60 Johns
Hopkins Series pt. 3, at 103 (1942).
10 15 Stat. 223 (1868), 22 U.S.C. § 1731 (1958). The statute also asserted that
naturalized citizens, while abroad, should receive "the same protection of persons and
property that is accorded to native-born citizens......
11 3 Moore, International Law 580 (1906) ; Tsiang, supra note 9, at 95.
12 See 15 Stat. 223 (1868), 22 U.S.C. § 1731 (1958).
13 The legislative and executive branches of the government made no serious at-
tempt to define expatriation regarding United States citizens. Tsiang, supra note 9,
at 45-86, 111-12.
14 Shanks v. Dupont, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 242, 246 (1830).
15 3 Moore, op. cit. supra note 11, at 554-62; Tsiang, supra note 9, at 61-70.
16 3 Moore, op. cit. supra note 11, at 562-76; Tsiang, supra note 9, at 71-86.
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zens was enunciated by various executive officers, this being corollary
to the concept of equality of citizenshipY1 Nevertheless, naturalized citizens
were sometimes instructed that they could not expect United States pro-
tection if, upon return to their country of origin, they were subjected to
legitimate legal and political duties.18
In the latter half of the nineteenth century, Congress continued to
remain silent regarding the loss of United States citizenship. During this
period, the executive branch of the government negotiated naturalization
treaties with many nations, the primary purpose being to define uniform
rules regarding recognition of their respective naturalization policies. Some
of these treaties provided that if the naturalized citizen should return to
his native land and establish residence for a definite period of time, his
adopted nation would not extend diplomatic protection to him, and he
would be presumed to have expatriated himself.' This presumption created
by the treaties was overcome if the individual returned to the United
States. 20
After the Expatriation Act of 1868,21 it was generally recognized
that American citizens, both native and naturalized, could expatriate
themselves. 22 In later decades of the nineteenth century, the problem of
finding a criterion of expatriation became increasingly acute due to the
number of citizens traveling to other nations.23  Determinations as to
whether a citizen had expatriated himself were made by State Department
officials on an ad hoc basis. These decisions were made by determining the
individual's intent as manifested by all the available information on his
particular situation.2 4 Certain acts clearly inconsistent with allegiance to
the United States, such as renunciation of American citizenship or swear-
ing allegiance to another nation, were regarded as tantamount to expatria-
tion.2 5 As a rule, residence abroad with intent to remain there was also
17 Letter From Mr. Monroe, Secretary of State, to Mr. Foster, British Minister,
May 30, 1812, in 3 Moore, op. cit. supra note 11, at 563, said: "It is impossible for the
United States to discriminate betveen their native and naturalized citizens...."
See Letter From Mr. Buchanan, Secretary of State, to Mr. Rosset, Nov. 25, 1845, in
3 Moore, op. cit. .supra note 11, at 566; Letter From Attorney General Black, Official
Opinions of the Attorneys General of the United States, July 4, 1859, in 3 Moore,
op. cit. supra note 11, at 574; Letter From Mr. Frelinghuyser, Secretary of State, to
Mr. Cramer, Minister to Switzerland, July 28, 1883, in 3 Moore, op. cit. supra note
11, at 584.
1s Letter From Mr. Wheaton, Minister to Prussia, to Mr. Knocke, July 24, 1840,
in 3 Moore, op. cit. supra note 11, at 564.
19 Tsiang, supra note 9, at 88-90.
20 Miller v. Sinjen, 289 Fed. 388, 392 (8th Cir. 1923) ; Stein v. Fleischmann Co.,
237 Fed. 679, 682, (S.D.N.Y. 1916).
21 15 Stat. 223 (1868), 22 U.S.C. § 1731 (1958).
22 Tsiang, supra note 9, at 97-104; Letter From Mr. Fish, Secretary of State, to
Mr. Washburne, Minister to France, June 28, 1873, in 3 Moore, op. cit. supra note 11,
at 712.
23 Tsiang, supra note 9, at 71.
24 Tsiang, supra note 9, at 99, 103.
25 3 Moore, op. cit. supra note 11, at 734-45; Tsiang, supra note 9, at 98-103.
[Vol. 26
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
a requisite to expatriation. 26 Residence alone, however, did not serve as
a basis for presuming that the citizen intended to expatriate himself.27
These determinations applied to both native-born and naturalized citizens,
although the presumption was stronger and was more quickly adopted
when the question involved a naturalized citizen residing in his country
of origin.2 8 Generally, the existence of these facts only raised a presump-
tion of expatriation, and the usual result was a loss of diplomatic protection
if the immigrant had occasion to appeal to the United States for protection
or intervention in his behalf. 29 As a rule, the presumption was effectively
rebutted and citizenship was retained if the individual returned to the
United States at a later date.30
The Citizenship Board of 1906 31 reported that the protection extended
to naturalized citizens abroad was equal to the protection accorded native-
born citizens, except during certain periods when the naturalized citizen
had not received full protection upon his return to the country of his
origin. The Board went on to say that this practice of equal treatment was
in accord with the views of the United States from the time of its inde-
pendence up to that date.
3 2
Both native-born and naturalized citizens abroad created problems
for the government because it was called upon to protect the citizens in
various altercations in foreign lands.33 The naturalized citizen, however,
created special problems when he returned to his native land. Some nations,
refusing to recognize a right of expatriation, exerted political control over
these persons. This created a dual citizenship situation, with the other
nation having an equal right to control the individual. 34 Some nations
recognized a qualified right in the individual to expatriate himself, but
nevertheless forced compliance with legal duties and political obligations
which either were unfulfilled when the individual emigrated to the United
States, or which accrued during this period.3' In other countries, the indi-
vidual was automatically repatriated if he returned and established resi-
dence for the prescribed time.36 The probability of these occurrences was
26 Letter From Mr. Bayard, Secretary of State, to Col. Frey, Swiss Minister,
May 20, 1887, in 3 Moore, op. cit. supra note 11, at 584.
27 Borchard, Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad 553 (1916); Tsiang,
supra note 9, at 98-99 (citing communications by Secretaries of State Washburne,
Evarts, Frelinghuyser, Davis, and Bayard).
28 See Tsiang, supra note 9, at 99, 107.
29 Borchard, op. cit. supra note 27, at 690; 3 Hacklworth, International Law 278-90
(1942).
30 U.S. Dept. of State Citizenship Board of 1906, "Report on the Subject of
Citizenship, Expatriation and Protection Abroad," H.R. Doe. No. 326, 59th Cong., 2d
Sess. 26 (1906) [hereinafter cited as Citizenship Board].
31 Id.
32 Id. at 8.
33 Id. at 25, 28 (citing President Grant's annual message to Congress, December
5, 1876).
34 Id. at 12.
35 Ibid.
36 Tsiang, supra note 9, at 94, 104.
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obviously increased whenever the naturalized citizen established long-term
residence in the country of his birth.
The unexpressed corollary to the Expatriation Act of 1868 37 was
that American citizens could also expatriate themselves. With this corol-
lary as a premise, and motivated by the increased number of United States
citizens going abroad for extended periods of time, the executive branch
of the government repeatedly urged Congress to define expatriation.38
Express renunciation of citizenship was rare, and the State Department
sought objective means of defining when and how United States citizen-
ship could be forfeited. 39 It was felt that, if these individuals had in fact
expatriated themselves, the government should not have to provide diplo-
matic protection for them when they became involved in either private
or public disputes, and that administrative convenience demanded that
definitive rules for terminating citizenship be adopted.40
In December 1906, after studying the problems of expatriation and
protection of citizens abroad, the Citizenship Board submitted its report to
Congress.41 One of the Board's recommendations was that a citizen should
be presumed expatriated if he resided in a foreign state for more than five
years without an intent to return to the United States.42 In March 1907,
Congress passed an act entitled "An Act in Reference to the Expatriation
of Citizens and Their Protection." 43 This act provided, inter alia, that
whenever a naturalized citizen resided for two years in his native state he
would be presumed to have expatriated himself.44 However, the presump-
tion could be rebutted by presenting to diplomatic or consular officials of the
United States objective evidence of lack of intent.45 With the exceptions
that the statute applied only to naturalized citizens and that it shifted the
burden of proof from the government to the individual, it was declaratory of
existing law. The rebuttable presumption was easy to overcome,4 and
the evidence used to overcome the presumption was the same evidence
used in the ad hoc determinations made by the State Department prior
to 1907.4 7 With few exceptions the presumption was treated by both the
courts and the State Department as one which never became conclusive.
Therefore, when a person returned to the United States, he resumed his
former status.48
In 1940, section 2 of the 1907 act was incorporated into section
37 15 Stat. 223 (1868), 22 U.S.C. § 1731 (1958).
38 Tsiang, supra note 9, at 94 et seq.
39 Citizenship Board, supra note 30, at 25-26.
40 Tsiang, supra note 9, at 97-108.
41 Citizenship Board, supra note 30.
42 Id. at 23.
43 34 Stat. 1228 (1907).
44 34 Stat. 1228 (1907).
45 3 HackNvorth, op. cit. supra note 29, at 286-90.
46 United States v. Gay, 264 U.S. 353, 358 (1924).
47 3 Hackvworth, op. cit. supra note 29, at 288.
48 Id. at 292-94 [citing Nurge v. Miller, 286 Fed. 982 (E.D.N.Y. 1923) and Sin-jen v. Miller, 281 Fed. 889 (D. Neb. 1922), aff'd, 289 Fed. 388 (8th Cir. 1923)].
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404(b) of a bill entitled the Nationality Act of 1940.49 The period of resi-
dence required was extended from two to three years and the three-year
residence became conclusive proof of expatriation, regardless of mitigating
factors suggesting a contrary intent on the part of the individual. 50 The
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 incorporated the provisions of
section 404(b) into section 352(a) (1) without significant changes. 51
Schneider v. Rusk represented the first time that the Supreme Court ruled
on the constitutionality of section 352(a) (1) or its predecessors.
The Constitution of the United States does not contain an explicit
provision vesting Congress with either the power to denationalize or the
power to prescribe definitive methods by which the citizen can expatriate
himself. Neither does constitutional history support the suggestion in
the dissenting opinion that Congress was granted the power to denation-
alize or expatriate citizens holding citizenship by way of naturalization.52
Although it has been suggested that article one, section eight, clause four
of the Constitution grants this power by implication, the records of the
Constitutional Convention evidence no intent on the part of the delegates
to make this grant.53 In both the Constitutional Convention and the debates
on the first naturalization bill, there was discussion concerning the con-
ditions which could be imposed upon an alien prior to his becoming a citizen.
However, only once was mention made of limiting the rights of a natural-
ized citizen by imposing a condition subsequent on his citizenship.54 The
clear consensus of opinion was against any restriction of this nature, and
the congressman making the suggestion of imposing a condition subsequent
repudiated it later in the same debate.55 Nineteenth century judicial inter-
pretations conclusively determined that the Constitution did not grant
Congress the power to expatriate or denationalize via article one, section
eight, clause four. These decisions also determined that native-born and
naturalized citizens had, in all respects save those enumerated in the Con-
stitution, equal rights of citizenship.56
There was little discussion concerning article one, section eight, clause
four at the Constitutional Convention. Prior to the adoption of the Con-
stitution, the states had plenary power over naturalization. Several states
49 54 Stat. 1163 (1940).
50 54 Stat. 1168 (1940).
51 66 Stat. 269 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1488(a) (1958).
52 See 3 Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, 638 (1911)
(index of clauses).
53 Ibid.
54 1 Annals of Cong. 1109-14 (1790).
55 Id. at 1113, (in attempting to limit the debate, Mr. Madison said that residence
as a prerequisite to citizenship was the question).
56 United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 703 (1898) ; Osborn v. United
States Bank, supra note 6, at 828 (1824). See 1 Crosskey, Politics and the Constitu-
tion 439-40 (1953). The distinctions drawn between native-born and naturalized citizens
by the framers of the Constitution were those explicitly included in the Constitution,
and these limitations imposed on naturalized citizens were not considered essential
rights of citizenship.
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had naturalization laws explicitly granting a foreign-born citizen all the
rights, privileges and immunities of his native-born counterpart.57 These
facts suggest that this policy of liberal naturalization laws would be con-
tinued by the federal government.
In 1915, the Supreme Court upheld the power of Congress to define
acts which would be conclusive evidence of expatriation. 58 The Court de-
fined this legislative power as an inherent power of government to regulate
foreign affairs. The Court reasoned that the federal government was sov-
ereign, all sovereign nations could regulate their foreign affairs, and that
this legislation was a legitimate expression of this inherent power.5 9 In
Perez v. Brownell,60 heretofore the leading case on the congressional power
to define expatriation, the Court upheld an expatriation statute which
made voting in a foreign election conclusive evidence of expatriation. 1'
The majority again relied upon the inherent power of the sovereign to
regulate foreign affairs, coupling this concept with the necessary and proper
clause to provide a constitutional basis for upholding the challenged
legislation.
In 1915, the Court had qualified this power by stating that the ex-
patriation could not be imposed without the "concurrence" of the citizen.0 2
The question whether "concurrence" requires the individual's subjective
assent or only the individual's objective assent-the performance of a pre-
scribed act-presently divides the Court.68 Majority opinions have uni-
formly held the view that "concurrence" means only the performance of the
acts prescribed by Congress-not the intent of the individual.64 Although
this issue was referred to in the majority opinion, it did not form the basis
for resolving the constitutional question in Schneider v. Rusk.
In Schneider v. Rusk, the Court faced the issue of whether section
352(a) (1) violated the due process limitations of the fifth amendment.65
In the Perez case, the constitutionality of section 349 of the Immigration
and Nationality Act6 was challenged: thus the Court was faced with
essentially the same question as was presented in the Schneider case. In
57 Citizenship Board, supra note 30, at 8.
58 Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299 (1915).
59 Ibid.
60 Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958).
61 66 Stat. 268 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (1958), defines acts constituting voluntary
expatriation whether committed by native-born or naturalized citizens. Voting in a
foreign election is one of the proscribed acts.
62 Mackenzie v. Hare, supra note 58, at 311.
63 Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 166 (1964).
64 Ibid.; see Perez v. Brownell, supra note 60, at 61.
65 In a recent Court decision concerning the validity of another act defined by
Congress to constitute conclusive evidence of expatriation, Mr. Justice Goldberg stated,
"It is fundamental that the great powers of Congress to conduct war and to regulate
the Nation's foreign relations are subject to the constitutional requirements of due
process." Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 164 (1963).
66 66 Stat. 267 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (1958).
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formulating a method for determining the constitutionality of the legisla-
tion in Perez v. Brownell, Mr. Justice Frankfurter said:
[A] rational nexus must exist between the content of a specific
power in Congress and the action of Congress in carrying that
power into execution... the means-in this case, withdrawal of
citizenship-must be reasonably related to the end-here, regula-
tion of foreign affairs. The inquiry-and, in the case before us,
the sole inquiry-into which the Court must enter is whether or
not Congress may have concluded not unreasonably that there
is a relevant connection between this fundamental source of power
and the ultimate legislative action.6 7
In Perez, the majority found the requisite rational nexus between the with-
drawal of the citizenship of an American who had voted in a political elec-
tion in a foreign country and congressional power to regulate foreign
affairs. 68 After finding a sufficient rational nexus between the constitu-
tional power, the means utilized, and the objective, Mr. justice Frankfurter
briefly considered the reasonableness of the means employed, i.e., expatria-
tion. His answer was: "The importance and extreme delicacy of the mat-
ters here sought to be regulated demand that Congress be permitted ample
scope in selecting appropriate modes for accomplishing its purpose." 69
Within broad limits, Congress was permitted to determine what solution
was reasonable once the rational nexus was found to exist. The balancing
of competing interests and values that would both support and deny the
legislation was left to the judgment of Congress and not to the Court.70
In Schneider v. Rusk, Mr. Justice Douglas appeared to rely on the
test used in Perez v. Brownell to resolve the constitutional question,71 but
in reality a somewhat different analysis was applied. Little consideration
was given to the question of whether a rational nexus existed between the
means employed and the objective to be obtained. The answer to this ques-
tion would have been yes,72 because it is clear that Congress enacted the
legislation at the request of the executive branch of the government 73 for
the purpose of resolving problems which could rationally be classified as
being connected with foreign affairs.74 The discrimination between native-
67 Perez v. Brownell, supra note 60, at 58.
68 The Court determined that the voting by an American citizen in a political
election of another country created a situation potentially embarrassing to the United
States in the conduct of her foreign affairs, and that it manifested conduct in some
measure inconsistent with sole allegiance to the United States.
69 Perez v. Brownell, supra note 60, at 60.
70 See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 88, 119-20 (1958) (dissenting opinion). Mr.
justice Frankfurter, dissenting, discusses the role of the Court in determining the
constitutionality of expatriation legislation.
71 Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 166 (1964).
72 See Schneider v. Rusk, 218 F. Supp. 302, 315 (1963) (dissenting opinion).
73 See Tsiang, "The Question of Expatriation in America Prior to 1907," 60
Johns Hopkins Series, pt 3, at 104. Hearings Before the House Committee on
Immigration and Naturalization, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 135-39 (1940).
74 Cf. note 106 infra.
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born and naturalized citizens, although possibly not warranted by the cir-
cumstances, was at least grounded upon a rational basis,75 since the auto-
matic termination of citizenship extinguished the foreign relations problem
created by the individual. The majority opinion asked whether the par-
ticular means adopted by Congress were reasonable, considering both the
necessity for, and the adverse effects resulting from, the legislation. 76 The
answer was no. In contrast, the majority in Perez v. Brownell had declined
to weigh the value of the particular legislative choice against its adverse
effects after it had once found a sufficient rational nexus. Thus the
Schneider majority departed from the solution in Perez, and examined
the reasonableness of the particular congressional choice for resolving a
national problem.
In balancing the deprivation to the individual against the public
need, the Court quoted Judge Fahy, who dissented in the district court:
"Such legislation... would have to be justified under the foreign relations
power 'by some more urgent public necessity than substituting administra-
tive convenience for the individual right of which the citizen is de-
prived.' "77 The majority's treatment of the issue appears similar to the
Court's treatment of legislation restricting first amendment rights in pur-
suance of legitimate legislative objectives such as civil order. In these
legislative areas, the Court has long demanded the existence of a rational
nexus and, in addition, has required a clear showing that the public
need for application of the restrictive legislation has outweighed the
unquestioned necessity of promoting and protecting the first amendment
rights to the greatest degree practicable. 78 Unlike the majority in Perez,
this majority was not willing to indulge in a sweeping presumption of con-
stitutionality.79 The Court appeared to be giving citizenship higher priority
in its constitutional scheme of values than heretofore.8 0 It is logical that
this "most precious right," 81 basic to the existence of the individual's other
rights, should be guarded by the same analysis as first amendment rights.
The majority opinion briefly discussed three factors which militated
against a finding that the statute was a reasonable exercise of legislative
power. The statute limited to three years the period in which a naturalized
citizen could go abroad without an extended return to the United States. 2
A limitation on a citizen's right to travel when and where he wishes does
75 Cf. text accompanying notes 32-34 supra.
76 Schneider v. Rusk, supra note 63, at 167.
77 Ibid.
78 See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952) ; Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S.
77 (1949) ; Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) ; Schneider v. Rusk, 218
F. Supp. 302, 315 (1958) (dissenting opinion).
79 Perez v. Brownell, supra note 60, at 60. See Schneider v. Irvington, 308 U.S.
147 (1939), on the presumption of constitutionality indulged when ruling on legislation
restricting freedom of speech.
80 See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 527 (1945), on the preferred position of
first amendment rights.
81 Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, supra note 65, at 159.
82 66 Stat. 269 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1484(a) (1958).
[Vol. 26
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
not seem to be in keeping with traditional American concepts of freedom.
Only some urgent national need should justify this limitation.8 3 In addition,
due to business and family connections still existing in his former country,
it would appear that the naturalized citizen would have more compelling
reasons for spending long periods of time abroad than would his native-
born counterpart. The statute appeared to assume an opposite conclusion.
A second factor which appeared to influence the majority was the in-
trinsic nature of the activity which caused expatriation. Prior to Schneider
v. Rusk, the Court had three times sustained the constitutionality of
statutes defining expatriation."4 In each decision the Court described the
conduct manifesting the concurrence of the citizen "as importing not only
something less than complete and unswerving allegiance to the United
States but also elements of an allegiance to another country in some
measure, at least, inconsistent with American citizenship." 85 The conduct
involved was voting in a political election in a foreign nation,8 swearing
allegiance to another nation, 7 and taking a foreigner as a husband.8 8 These
and other acts defined under section 3498s9 as manifesting an intent to
expatriate oneself were arguably of a much different character than mere
residence. As said in the majority opinion: "Living abroad... is no badge
of lack of allegiance and in no way evidences a voluntary renunciation of
nationality and allegiance." 90 Prior to 1940, residence alone was not
decisive in determining whether the intent of an individual was to ex-
patriate himself. In the prior cases upholding expatriation statutes, the
fact that the criticized conduct imported a lack of allegiance appeared to
be crucial to the members of the Court who voted to sustain the con-
stitutionality of the act.91 The Court has held that Congress can define
objective standards for determining when a citizen intends to expatriate
himself. 2 However, the fact that the conduct relied upon by Congress
tended to correlate convincingly with the intent attributed to those ex-
patriated may more easily have brought the legislation within the require-
ment of due process of law.9 3 Here the Court would not accept the con-
tention that residence abroad manifested a lack of allegiance, and this
was important in determining the reasonableness of the statute.
83 Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964). See Schneider v. Rusk,
218 F. Supp. 302, 321 (1958) (dissenting opinion).
84 Perez v. Brownell, supra note 60; Savorgnan v. United States, 338 U.S. 491
(1950) ; Mackenzie v. Hare, supra note 58.
85 Perez v. Brownell, supra note 60, at 61.
86 Id. at 64.
87 Savorgnan v. United States, supra note 84.
88 Mackenzie v. Hare, supra note 58.
89 66 Stat. 245 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1431 (1958).
90 Schneider v. Rusk, supra note 71, at 169.
91 Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, supra note 65, at 214 (dissenting opinion).
92 Mackenzie v. Hare, .mpra note 58.
93 In Savorgnan v. United States, supra note 84, the Court expressly found that
petitioner did not intend to expatriate herself; however, this is not to say that the
act of swearing allegiance to another nation would not, as a rule, correctly manifest
this intent.
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A third factor which the Court found important in reaching its de-
cision was that the statute created "second class citizenship" because it
applied only to naturalized citizens. Mr. Justice Douglas stated, "This
statute proceeds on the impermissible assumption that naturalized citizens
as a class are less reliable and bear less allegiance to this country than do
t~e native born." 14 By reasoning from this premise, Mr. Justice Douglas
ignored material considerations which supported the enactment of this
legislation. To the degree it was felt that return to one's former country
might stimulate allegiance for that nation, his assertion of the rationale
of the statute was correct.95 To the extent that the dissent relies upon
the presumption of residence abroad as indicating a lack of allegiance,
this assertion is also not in error.96 However, Mr. Justice Douglas did not
do justice to the legislation when he asserted that the statute proceeded on
the assumption that foreign-born citizens bear less allegiance than do
native citizens. The naturalized citizen did create a peculiar problem for
the government, and demonstrably one purpose of the statute under exam-
ination was to eliminate the problem.97 When the naturalized citizen re-
turns to his former nation, a peculiar problem arises 98 which may permit
special classification. With such a rational basis, some discriminatory
legislation arguably would not deny due process. 9 Therefore it may be
error to condemn the statute's classification as arbitrary under an equal
protection application of the due process clause of the fifth amendment.100
Conversely, there is strong tradition opposing any classification be-
tween native-born and naturalized citizens, beyond the express classification
of the Constitution.' As a rule, the Supreme Court has not upheld such
classifications. 10 2 In a case involving fraudulent naturalization, the Court
remarked that "citizenship obtained through naturalization is not second
class citizenship." 103
The dissent relied upon Mackenzie v. Hare as authority for a classifi-
cation of the type under consideration.10 4 In that case, the Court sustained
the practice of relieving women of their citizenship when they married
foreigners, while men retained their status as citizens. The classification
94 Schneider v. Rusk, supra note 71, at 168.
95 Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 168 (1964).
96 Id. at 178 (dissenting opinion).
97 Cf. text accompanying notes 32-34 supra.
98 See Roche, "The Loss of American Nationality-The Development of Statutory
Expatriation," 99 U. Pa. L. Rev. 25, 41 (1950); cf. text accompanying notes 32-34
supra.
99 See Schneider v. Rusk, supra note 63, at 176 (dissenting opinion). Roche,
supra note 98, at 41 states: "It is possible that Congress could constitutionally create
second class citizenship."
100 See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954); Hirabayashi v. United
States, 320 U.S. 81, 100-01 (1943).
101 Osborn v. United States Bank, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 737 (1824).
102 Knauer v. United States, 328 U.S. 654 (1946) ; Luria v. United States, 231
U.S. 9 (1913) ; United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898).
103 Knauer v. United States, supra note 102, at 658.
104 Schneider v. Rusk, supra note 71, at 170 (dissenting opinion).
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was upheld upon the "unity of interest" doctrine in vogue in 1915, and
upon the widely accepted principle of international law, then prevailing,
that this act by naturalized women was an act of expatriation. 10 5 The
majority did not accept Mackenzie as authority for supporting the Schnei-
der classification. The Mackenzie Court was able to find that marriage to
a foreigner reasonably implied a potential lack of allegiance on the part
of a woman. The Schneider majority could not find residence abroad a
reasonable basis for implying a potential lack of allegiance in a naturalized
citizen. Thus, the premise of the marriage statute was held to be reason-
able; the premise of the residence statute was held unreasonable.
Mackenzie aside, it is arguable that the statute should not have been
invalidated solely on the basis of the differentiation between native-born
and naturalized citizens. This is not to say that this factor, coupled with
the statute's other undesirable features, was not enough to render the
statute unconstitutional in any balancing of competing interests.
Regarding section 352(a)(1), two other factors not explicitly dis-
cussed in the majority opinion deserve comment. The operation of the
statute often did not conform to the primary, expressed purposes for its
existence. The statute provided for automatic expatriation of all those
residing in their country of former citizenship, regardless of whether or
not these individuals had created the type of national problem that the
statute purported to obviate. Two of the major purposes of the statute
were to keep the government from having to intervene in behalf of those
persons who, for all intents and purposes, had abandoned citizenship and
to provide a simple administrative answer for determining when those
individuals involved in disputes had in fact given up citizenship. 106 How-
ever, the effect of the statute expatriated many who had created no inter-
national problem for the government, needlessly depriving them of
citizenship. As was said by Mr. Justice Brennan, the power of Congress
to expatriate exists only "where its exercise was intrinsically and peculiarly
appropriate to the solution of serious problems inevitably implicating
nationality .... ,, 107
A second factor which is vitally important in any judicial determina-
tion involving a balancing of competing interests is the existence of possible
alternative measures.10 s Several proposals have been suggested in the
past and the distinct possibility that functional alternatives exist may have
been an implicit factor influencing the majority. 109
Contrasted against the interests which negatived section 352(a) (1)
were its partially interrelated purposes and motivating factors: avoidance
of United States involvement in disputes when foreign nations exerted
control over their nationals, ignoring the effect of United States naturaliza-
105 Mackenzie v. Hare, supra note 58, at 311.
108 See Hearings Before the House Committee on Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 135-38 (1940) ; 86 Cong. Rec. 11945-49 (1940) ; 41 Cong.
Rec. 1463 et seq. (1907) ; Citizenship Board, supra note 30, at 23-28.
107 Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, -supra note 65, at 187 (concurring opinion).
108 Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
109 See Roche, supra note 98, at 71; Note, 49 Cornell L.Q. 78-79 (1963).
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tion; administrative convenience in determining when the citizen had
expatriated himself (in contrast to nineteenth century procedures); the
feeling that the citizen should not be entitled to the benefits of American
citizenship without living in the United States; and the assumption that
either the naturalized citizen bears less allegiance to the United States
or that this allegiance is lost more easily on return to his former nation.
The first two purposes were rational responses to national problems
and, on the basis of prior decisions of the Supreme Court, some congres-
sional action could have been taken to eliminate or mitigate these problems.
The question involved, however, was whether section 352 (a) (1) was a
reasonable decision given all of the existing circumstances, including
important restrictive factors suggesting that the statute was not appropriate.
It would appear that the latter two motivating factors did not fall
within the power ascribed to Congress, and would not be appropriate
reasons for legislation because they did not involve a problem of foreign
affairs. The Constitution does not direct that a citizen have residence in
the United States in order to maintain his citizenship. In this day and
age it does not seem rational that a citizen should lose his citizenship
solely because his residence is abroad. Nor, as the majority opinion main-
tained, is it reasonable to assume that the allegiance of the naturalized
citizen is jeopardized by residence in a country where he formerly held
citizenship.
Because the statute eliminated some instances of dual citizenship, the
dissent relied upon this as being a policy factor supporting the statute's
constitutionality. The statute, however, operated regardless of whether or
not a dual citizenship problem was extant and whether or not another
nation claimed the citizen as its own. The statute's effect on the citizen
could often have been statelessness in the situation where the individual
was expatriated by the United States but where he was not recognized
as a citizen in the nation where he was residing. In addition, it would
appear that there is no basis for statutory accommodation with nations
which recognize no right of expatriation in their citizens without aban-
donment of the traditional United States' attitude that expatriation requires
a decision by the citizen.
Because Schneider v. Rusk does not stand for the proposition that
Congress may not define expatriation, the dissent's reliance on the history
of expatriation in the United States only supports its argument if that
history sustains expatriation on the basis of residence. It is stretching the
point to argue that since residence abroad, coupled with the existence of
other factors, was once used to create a continually rebuttable presumption
of expatriation, residence alone can now be relied upon exclusively to
determine whether an individual gave up his citizenship rights. In addition,
assuming history did support the existence of this statute, the impact of
this history would be considerably mitigated by the Court's method of
determining the constitutionality of the statute. History is only one factor
to be considered in the balancing of interests. With strong competing
interests and values opposing existence of the statute, it is questionable
whether the legislation could be sustained.
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In attacking the majority's due process argument, the dissent appears
to misconstrue the majority's reasoning. The dissent suggests that the
majority opinion was based solely upon the arbitrary classification between
native-born and naturalized citizens."10 However, the majority opinion
provided several grounds for declaring section 352 (a) (1) unconstitutional,
classification being only one of them. Further, Mr. Justice Clark reasons
that the majority position implies Congress could expatriate all citizens
and that, given this premise, Congress could certainly pass a more narrowly
confined statute aimed at those citizens who create special problems for
the federal government."' To the contrary, the majority opinion ex-
plicitly states that there are formidable limits on the power of Congress
to expatriate or denaturalize anyone. 112 In reasoning that Congress could
constitutionally enact the more narrow statute expatriating naturalized
citizens, the dissent implicitly refuses to accept the balancing test applied
in the majority opinion.
In summary, the decision in Schneider v. Rusk does not directly impair
the constitutionality of similar statutes defining expatriation because the
Court invalidated the statute on the basis of its peculiar operation and
effect. The significance of the instant case lies in the method of analysis
adopted by the majority-the application of the "balancing of interests"
test in addition to the rational nexus requirement of Perez. If this method
of analysis is followed in resolving future challenges to expatriation statutes,
the statutes will be more closely scrutinized than heretofore. A showing
that the necessity for particular legislation outweighs its adverse effects
will be required by the Court. Furthermore, those Court members who
maintain that expatriation is unconstitutional without the subjective assent
of the individual involved could effectively utilize the balancing test to
strengthen their position. The requirement that the conduct relied upon to
show expatriation be "conduct inconsistent with undiluted allegiance to
this country" was strongly emphasized in this case. This requirement
could be applied so broadly as to demand a showing that the conduct
prescribed be so dearly inconsistent with "undiluted allegiance" that it
would corroborate subjective assent by the citizen. Thus the Court could
alter the constitutional demands upon expatriation legislation without
explicitly applying a different test.
110 Schneider v. Rusk, supra note 95, at 176 (dissenting opinion).
111 Ibid.
112 Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 168 (1964): "This Court has never held
that Congress' power to expatriate may be used unsparingly in every area where it
has general power to act."
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